This is post number eight in a series detailing Southern Whiggery. See the sidebar for earlier posts.
__________________________________________
In my last post, I made reference to a 1954 American Historical Review article by Charles Grier Sellers titled “Who Were the Southern Whigs”. In the article, Mr. Sellers argued against Southern Whiggery being the result of state-rights sentiment, but rather the result of adverse reaction to Jackson’s Bank War. In that same post, I countered that had Whiggery been simply National Republicans in drag the Southern state righters would have never been involved at all. Taking that one step further, Clay would not have gained control of the Senate committees in December 1833, and the term Whig would have remained where it belonged with the patriots of ’76, John C. Calhoun, and the Southern Nullifiers/state righters who opposed the central government’s overreach (protective tariff/military coercion against a sovereign state). No matter what Southern Whiggery became, or Whiggery period for that matter, its roots are South Carolina’s nullifiers and the grudging support Calhoun’s principles found among the likes of John Tyler of Virginia, Wylie P. Mangum of North Carolina, and Dixon Lewis of Alabama. It is this core that Henry Clay locked his sights on and into which he moved the National Republicans lock, stock, and barrel, leaving the Old Jeffersonian Party to the Jacksonians. In so doing, Clay struck out anew, freed of the overt “nominal” baggage of the defunct Federalists who had found their way into National Republican ranks. Covert or not, those men followed Clay out of the Jeffersonian Party and shortly after identified as Whigs (Northern Whigs).
__________________________________________
In my last post, I made reference to a 1954 American Historical Review article by Charles Grier Sellers titled “Who Were the Southern Whigs”. In the article, Mr. Sellers argued against Southern Whiggery being the result of state-rights sentiment, but rather the result of adverse reaction to Jackson’s Bank War. In that same post, I countered that had Whiggery been simply National Republicans in drag the Southern state righters would have never been involved at all. Taking that one step further, Clay would not have gained control of the Senate committees in December 1833, and the term Whig would have remained where it belonged with the patriots of ’76, John C. Calhoun, and the Southern Nullifiers/state righters who opposed the central government’s overreach (protective tariff/military coercion against a sovereign state). No matter what Southern Whiggery became, or Whiggery period for that matter, its roots are South Carolina’s nullifiers and the grudging support Calhoun’s principles found among the likes of John Tyler of Virginia, Wylie P. Mangum of North Carolina, and Dixon Lewis of Alabama. It is this core that Henry Clay locked his sights on and into which he moved the National Republicans lock, stock, and barrel, leaving the Old Jeffersonian Party to the Jacksonians. In so doing, Clay struck out anew, freed of the overt “nominal” baggage of the defunct Federalists who had found their way into National Republican ranks. Covert or not, those men followed Clay out of the Jeffersonian Party and shortly after identified as Whigs (Northern Whigs).
Add to that the Southern
National Republicans, who were already sitting in good political stead when
Clay consolidated his new party. These men remained nationalists in the
“National Republican” scheme of things. Oh, they wanted the South to have her
rights within the nation, but with the choice between nationalism
(Union/centralization) and state-rights, nationalism held sway. For those of
that stripe, Southern Whiggery evolved,
and Southern sectionalism evolved along with it.
For those of you who have been
following my series on Alcorn, think back on his criticism of Jefferson Davis’
execution of the War Between the States. James Alcorn was a Southern nationalist...and a centralizer. That is a characteristic of Southern Whiggery
passed down from the National Republicans.
Another failure in the study of Southern Whiggery that Charles Sellers
points to is the missing, according
to him, application of geographical sectionalism within the states
themselves—the division between upcountry and low country, hill country and
black belt. Sellers suggests the study of that aspect of Southern Whiggery has
been omitted due to the focus on national sectionalism and state rights and that
the Southern Whigs’ opposition to the nationalistic leg of the party has been
over emphasized. Well, maybe it had dropped out of the narrative by 1954, but
Arthur Cole certainly mentioned it in Whig
Party of the South published in 1914. Perhaps in the not so distant past
(sixty years ago) there was a tendency to focus on the party after attacks on
slavery had caused Southerners to close ranks, obscuring the look back at the
social, economic, and ideological lines that originally crisscrossed within
each state—Sellers did make reference to the “modern” scholar of the subject,
but Sellers specific references to Cole’s shortcomings in his article mitigates
against that. I’ve not noted that omission myself. I’ve always known that the
Whigs represented business and banking interests and in the South included the
wealthiest cotton planters.
Sellers goes on to imply that recent studies (circa 1954)
fail to recognize that when the Whig party formed, the antebellum South had a
vigorous two-party system, and the individual voter was focused on his party
and its place and success within the section of the state he resided. The
banding together of Southern Whigs (and Democrats) against a common,
anti-Southern foe didn’t evolve until the late 1840s. Now, I do believe the study
of Southern Whiggery is lacking...or lost. Where I disagree with Sellers is
where...well... the point made when I started this post—Sellers’ argument that the
formation of the party in the South was over the Bank, not state-rights. I believe
it was both. I think there was a big dichotomy in Southern Whiggery—strict
construction/loose construction, republicanism/nationalism, state rights/Union,
and constitutionality/tyranny. I say this because I can see the dual nature of
Southern Whiggery in my study of Reconstruction. Both strains bled through to
the end.
Let’s look first at the 1824 election that sent John Quincy
Adams to the White House and the more popular Andrew Jackson back to Tennessee
and how it panned out in Dixie: Andrew Jackson carried Mississippi, Alabama,
Louisiana (except the extreme southeast, where the sugar barons resided—they
went for Adams), both North and South Carolina, and most of Maryland. Missouri
and Kentucky went for Clay. Georgia went for William Crawford (a native son) as
did Virginia and extreme western Maryland.
[It’s sometimes hard to align the
politicians of this era primarily because party principles/platforms hadn’t
solidified. The term National Republican doesn’t appear until 1830, and since
we know that some National Republicans had started calling themselves Whigs by
the spring of 1834, the term wasn’t around long (though you wouldn’t know it by
the way it pops up in history). Nevertheless, though the life of the name was
brief during its day, the principles of National Republicanism within the
Democratic-Republican ranks went back to the presidency of James Madison who promoted
a kinder, gentler form of government interference...oops, excuse me..., I meant
to say, promotion of the national
economy manifested by Henry Clay’s American System. In applying terms to the Adams’
administration, these men are often called anti-Jacksonians; however, that
term is used well into the Jacksonian period and it does not follow (at least,
in my mind) that all anti-Jacksonians were National Republicans in the “Madisonian”sense of the term.]
Now let’s look at the Southern state legislative elections
following the formation of the Whig Party in the winter/spring of 1833-1834.
And before I continue, this is how I plan to frame this series on the Southern
Whigs—reviewing politics within each Southern state vis-à-vis what’s happening
with the national party and the Whig delegations in Congress.
This information on the 1834 and 1835 state elections is culled
primarily from Michael Holt’s Rise and
Fall of the American Whig Party.
In Maryland,
Kentucky, and Louisiana the National Republicans already had a hold. Here
the National Republicans carried on under their new name and the conversion was pretty much seamless. Maryland always
having been a predominantly National Republican state, the Whigs won 5 of 8 congressional seats in 1835, and in Clay’s Kentucky
during the summer/fall of 1835, Whigs won 8 of 13 congressional seats, up 5
seats from the previous Congress (Kentucky also gained a seat that year).
Much farther south, Louisiana’s
Whigs won the governorship in July of 1834. An overly optimistic Clay
attributed the victory (along with gubernatorial wins in Indiana and Illinois)
as a referendum against Jackson. In Louisiana, however, the Whig victory dealt more with the popularity of the candidates and factional
rivalries than national issues. Though Louisiana’s Whig legislators denounced
removal of the deposits in the spring, it was ethnic rivalries between French
Creoles in Southern Louisiana and native Americans in the northern part of the
state (I think Holt here refers to white folks who had moved in vs the
French-mix, who had been in Southeastern Louisiana since the early 18th century) had
long shaped state politics. The Creoles had maintained power through suffrage
restrictions, gubernatorial patronage, and over representation in the legislature.
When the Democratic nominee suggested changing the situation in 1834, the
Creoles rallied behind the Whig candidate, who just happened to be a Creole,
and the Whigs prevailed.*
In Virginia, nationalists
in the west (National Republicans representing the region’s mining interests)
who’d backed Clay in the 1832 presidential contest merged with the more
numerous eastern state-rights advocates to condemn Jackson’s removal of the deposits . This coalition
adopted the Whig name and took the Virginia legislature in 1834. The
legislature then forced the resignation of Jacksonian William C. Rives from the
Senate by instructing him to vote for restoration of the deposits (which he
refused to do). In his stead, it elected prominent state righter Benjamin
Watkins Leigh to replace Rives. John Tyler, another state righter, was
Virginia’s senior senator. State righter Littleton W. Tazewell was elected
governor. In Virginia, the struggle was one between liberty and power, rather
than bank or no bank.
In North Carolina, Calhounites
led by John Branch, state-rights followers of the influential Senator Willie P.
Mangum, and a tiny group of National Republicans joined forces to protest
Jackson’s removal of the deposits and to contest the August legislative election.
By the summer of 1834, they were using the name Whig to identify themselves
even though North Carolina Whigs didn’t hold their first state convention until
December 1835. As it turned out, the national issue of the bank deposits didn’t
make the cut in North Carolina. The Whigs needed state issues with which to
confront the Democrats, because taking on Jackson with only a national issue didn’t engage the voting populace.* The Democrats defeated the Whigs in August
and immediately tried to push Mangum out (but he held on until November 1836). By
the summer/fall of 1835 the Whigs held only six of thirteen Congressional
seats. Still, that’s more than the three seats held the year Jackson won
reelection.
Georgia’s congressional
election of 1834 and the 1835 gubernatorial race was between a pro-Jackson Union
party and an anti-Jackson state-rights party led by John M. Berrien. The
state-rights party denounced the removal of the deposits as tyranny and
economically pernicious, but its main platform was support of state rights and
hostility to Jackson’s Proclamation to the people of South Carolina and the
Force Bill. But again, Holt points
out that state issues* were missing and what the Georgia “Whigs” had in their
arsenal were national issues. The Georgia pro-Jackson Democrats swept the
congressional and legislative elections. In 1835, the Democrats elected both
the governor and four congressmen.
In Mississippi, a
state-rights association formed in the spring of 1834 in protest of the Force
Bill, and in December, a Whig convention met denouncing the removal of the
deposits and Jackson’s tyranny. This group then arranged a ticket, designed to gain state-rights support for the
gubernatorial and congressional elections scheduled for November. The plan was to fuse the two major anti-Jacksonian groups
in the state. In 1835, the Whigs won the governorship, but lost both
congressional seats and the legislature by more than a two to one margin.
Missouri gave up
no congressional seats to the Whigs in 1835; however, John Bull, a National Republican (and prior Jackson
elector) was the first occupant of a newly created congressional seat in 1833
(Missouri’s second). That says something to me. He was replaced by a Jacksonian
Democrat, Albert Harrison in 1835—well, that says something, too, doesn’t it?
By the end of 1834, Alabama
was one of only three Southern states that had not formed an anti-Democratic
party that might align with the Whigs. The other two were Tennessee and South
Carolina. In 1835 Whigs held two of Alabama’s five Congressional seats.
In the spring and fall of 1835, Tennessee Whigs won 8 of 13 congressional seats, a major shift from
the one seat National Republicans had traditionally held in that state in the
years leading up to the Twenty-fourth Congress. The Whigs also won the
gubernatorial contest over three-time incumbent Democrat William Carroll, but
that victory had less to do with national issues and more to do with both state
issues and Hugh White’s nomination as the Whig candidate for president to run against
Van Buren. White’s candidacy, in fact, was the impetus for the formation of the
Whig Party in Tennessee (1835). The Whig candidate for governor, Newton
Cannon, won based on the huge vote from east Tennessee where Cannon’s advocacy
for state-financed internal improvements found favor. The voter turnout in the
1835 gubernatorial contest was huge, even greater than that in the presidential
race a year later (not unusual, except that Hugh White was a native son).
Nevertheless, it was the gubernatorial race, not White’s candidacy, that
solidified the Whig Party in Tennessee.
I have omitted South Carolina from the study, for she
never formally participated in Clay’s altered Whiggery.
*Professor Holt makes this observation in discussing the
state elections: Where the Whig Party campaigned almost exclusively against
Jackson, one on one—especially where the only issues were national ones, the
Jacksonians won. So for the Whigs, the glow of the spring of ’34 was dimming by
the fall and had grown dismal as of 1835 (well, except in Tennessee where
Whiggery was apparently booming). The improving economic situation resulting from an
infusion of European capital and Biddle’s easing up on contraction had relieved
the brief resentment against Democratic banking policies and prevented the
Whigs from exploiting Jackson’s new anti-banking initiatives: specifically, his
hard money initiative undermining circulatability of private banknotes and his Species Circular prohibiting the
purchase of public land with paper money, an act that alienated Democratic
businessmen. In time these practices would provide ammunition for Whig campaigners, but the
three year boom starting in 1834 nullified Whig gains to date.
The election of 1836, Van Buren, the sub-treasury...and their effects on Whiggery in Dixie yet to come.
Thanks for reading,
Charlsie
The National Republicans, i.e., Whigs, I understand were Clay supporters and supporters of his American System. And the Southern Whigs supported the American System as well, in spite of tariffs which hurt them economically?
ReplyDelete